Naomi Hart explains why petition and forced migration are not the solution to Iraq’s problems.
In September 2007, three-quarters of the United States Senate voted in favour of a resolution stating that Iraq has broken up and cannot be put back together. Yea-voting Senators approved of dividing Iraq into separate Shia, Sunni and Kurdish states – either wholly independent of each other, or co-existing in the loosest of confederations – to maintain peace between the ethnic groups.
Opponents of partition highlight numerous drawbacks to carving Iraq into pieces. It would be immensely difficult to define the states’ borders and to divide Baghdad in a way that satisfied all three sects, and to ensure that all three states were economically viable, given that three-quarters of Iraq’s oil reserves are located in the would-be Shiite state in the south. The threat of conflict between the new states would be omnipresent. And the wisdom of defining three states according to ethno-religious identities is questionable: ill-defined ethno-religious identity would itself become an inevitable source of conflict within the states.
But a critical obstacle would arise even before the new states were formed: the transfer of populations between them. Although Shiites predominate in the country’s south, Sunnis in the west and Kurds in the northeast, no region is ethnically homogenous. In urban areas, especially cities such as Baghdad, Kirkuk and Mosul, there are no clear geographical boundaries separating the groups. Dividing these cities, or allocating them wholly to a prospective state, would force tens of thousands of Iraqis to move from their homes to a state prescribed, somewhat arbitrarily, by ethnicity. Such transfers could be legally mandated as a term in the partition contract, or Iraqis could be unofficially compelled to emigrate out of fear of persecution by the ethnic majority.
Movement of such large populations is perilous. Following the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947, hundreds of thousands of internally displaced people undergoing ‘transfer’ under the partition agreement died from fatigue or were killed because they were mistakenly diverted through conflict zones. Ideally, personnel overseeing population transfers in Iraq – American, NATO or EU troops or UN peacekeepers – could choose a route that would avoid hotspots. But in a country as incendiary as Iraq, no third party can guarantee that they will identify every danger to people travelling between the new states. Misinterpretations are common in countries ravaged by civil strife, like Iraq.
Even if a secure route could be plotted reliably, providing sufficient personnel, food, shelter and medical supplies to make the actual journey possible entails exorbitant costs. Following the unofficial partition of Cyprus in 1974, the transfer of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, in numbers similar to those who would be forced to emigrate in Iraq, required an investment of $U.S.22 million per annum for five years and an extra $U.S.10 million per annum for the next 20 years. If donor fatigue set in – and Congress is already weary of Bush’s war expenses – then people midway through their journey would be left isolated without resources or support.
Equally significant is the immeasurable personal cost to those who are forced to relocate. Acquiring compensation for property loss is complicated and protracted. Despite the unique efficiency of the Property Law Implementation Plan in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it will take 20 years to process all the claims by Serbs who lost property in the now Bosnian-Croat Federation, and 40 years for Bosniacs and Croatians who lost theirs in the now Serb Republic. Compensation programs in Iraq would be even more complex because of the difficulties of ascertaining exactly who lost property, and just how much they lost, during and since the devastating 2003 occupation.
There are also costs that simply cannot be quantified. Iraqis forced to relocate would lose their homes, business networks and relations within a community, and would face joblessness, food insecurity and homelessness. For centuries, the ancient city of Samarra, situated in the now Sunni-dominated Salahaddin province, has attracted thousands of Shia pilgrims. No amount of reimbursement could compensate for their loss if the new Sunni state severed their connection to that land. The trauma they would experience could only inflame relations between the prospective Sunni and Shia states.
Iraq’s break-up, and the concomitant population relocations, are not the inevitable outcomes of ethnically-based civil strife. Countries like Spain and post-conflict Rwanda demonstrate that previously hostile ethnic groups can co-exist when their security is guaranteed and satisfactory power-sharing models are developed. Already conflict in Iraq has declined as the surge of American troops improves security and Iraqis of different ethnicities recognise that their greatest enemies are not each other but foreign terrorist groups. Compelling tens of thousands of Iraqis to immigrate to ethnically-defined states would be a step in the wrong direction.
Naomi Hart is in her fourth year of a combined degree in Arts and Law. She is currently undertaking honours in Modern History
